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FREE SPEECH AT WHAT COST?: SNYDER V. PHELPS AND
SPEECH-BASED TORT LIABILITY
Jeffrey Shulman*
“[T]he right of every person ‘to be let alone’ must be placed in the
scales with the right of others to communicate.”1

INTRODUCTION
The constitutional law on speech-based tort claims is something
akin to a doctrinal funhouse. A bewilderment of public and private
mirrors, fact and opinion trapdoors, it is law that balances private and
public interests in a complicated and ever-shifting calculus. Thus, when
I say that the Fourth Circuit got it wrong in Snyder v. Phelps,2 it is with
no little sense of the challenges a court would face to get it right. It is
always a hard case when fundamental interests collide, but the Fourth
Circuit’s decision tilts doctrine too far in the direction of free speech,
upsetting the Supreme Court’s careful weighing of interests that takes
into account both the need for robust political debate and the need to
protect private individuals from personal abuse. The court’s reasoning
in Snyder follows the lead set out by the Supreme Court in Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell,3 but that was a case with different types of actors,
a different type of speech, a different communicative setting, and
different policy concerns to consider. The Fourth Circuit failed to give
these differences due weight, and took a step too far when it applied
New York Times4 protection to speech undeserving of such
constitutional solicitude.
The court muddled through the law,
illustrating how unfair it can be to apply to private parties doctrine
* Associate Professor, Legal Research and Writing, Georgetown University Law Center.
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison. For their
continuing support of my scholarship, I would like to thank Professors Robin West and Steven
Goldberg. My discussions about this article with Professor David Wolitz were of invaluable
assistance. My thanks to May Chiang for expert editorial assistance. (Professor Shulman
submitted an amicus brief on behalf of Albert Snyder to the Fourth Circuit. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae Jeffrey I. Shulman in Support of Appellee, Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2008)
(No. 08-1026), 2008 WL 3460050.).
1 Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).
2 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010).
3 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
4 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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developed to protect public discourse; but it was a muddle of the
Supreme Court’s making—and it will be up to the Supreme Court to
unmuddle it.
With unfeigned caution, then, I want to make four modest points
about the Fourth Circuit’s decision, each of which addresses the need to
secure what is purely private from injurious speech.
1. The Fourth Circuit decided that the issues animating the protest of
the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC) were matters of public
concern.5 Of course, the “issue[s] of homosexuals in the military,
the sex-abuse scandal within the Catholic Church, and the political
and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens” are matters
of public concern.6 But none of these is the issue whose publicness
the Fourth Circuit was called upon to consider. That issue is
whatever connection Matthew Snyder had to these matters. In the
world of speech-based torts, whether a matter is one of legitimate
public concern depends on the content, effect, and significance of the
plaintiff’s conduct, not the subjective and unilateral assertions of the
defendant. WBC must show that that connection is of public
concern. Otherwise, every soldier, every Catholic, etc., no matter
how assiduously he or she has avoided the public fray, would be
subject to targeted personal assault as long as WBC speaks under the
mantle of some public concern, no matter how tenuously that
concern is connected to the conduct of WBC’s target. WBC is free
to believe what it wants about the death of soldiers, but its beliefs do
not render Matthew’s funeral a matter of public concern. (Neither
the analysis of the Fourth Circuit nor that of the district court relied
on any distinction between Albert Snyder and his son.7 This article
similarly does not distinguish between the two for purposes of the
“public concern” and “public figure” analyses.).
2. The Fourth Circuit’s decision turned on the court’s determination
that WBC’s speech, even if it was not a matter of public concern,
was mere rhetorical hyperbole (and, thus, not provably false; and
thus protected opinion).8 Whatever sense this reasoning makes in the
area of public debate, it creates a perverse incentive for WBC to be
especially abusive and inflammatory: the more hyperbolically hateful
the speech, the more it is constitutionally protected. By the court’s
logic, speech about private figures enjoys constitutional immunity
from tort claims as long as the defendant speaks with sufficient
rhetorical flourish—that is to say, with sufficient viciousness. This
doctrinal borrowing from defamation makes little sense where the
plaintiff brings an emotional distress claim. First, when the
5
6
7
8

See 580 F.3d at 222-24.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 222 n.17.
580 F.3d at 220, 222-24.
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plaintiff’s claim is based on emotional injury caused by non-provable
speech, the state’s interest in the protection of private personality is
greater. The defamation plaintiff is injured by false statements of
fact: where there is no provable factual assertion, there is little
chance of reputational injury. No one will believe what is clearly
hyperbolic rhetoric. But those same words can heighten a plaintiff’s
emotional distress (and the more hyperbolic, the more the harm),
whether or not the defendant’s message is verifiable. Second, the
value of the speech at issue, and thus the need to offer it
constitutional protection, is lesser. Statements meant merely to cause
emotional injury to private plaintiffs bear only the most superficial
resemblance to protected forms of speech.
3. There is no justification for applying the actual malice standard to
emotional distress claims outside the public arena (and little enough
inside). The literal application of the actual malice standard offers
no protection to the plaintiff claiming emotional injury from
rhetorically hyperbolic speech. The victim of a libel can show that
the statement was false. The victim of rhetorical hyperbole can
prove or disprove nothing that will bring judicial redress. This may
be the cost of doing business in the public arena, but why should the
private plaintiff be left defenseless against emotionally injurious
speech that serves no valid communicative purpose?
4. The availability of tort remedies for injurious speech is critical if
private individuals are to peacefully exercise their own constitutional
rights. The state has a substantial interest in protecting families’
“personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead” and in keeping
the most intimate of moments from “unwarranted public
exploitation.”9 Mr. Snyder should have the opportunity to show that
WBC’s targeted picketing “was intended to cause him and his family
substantial psychological distress,”10 not to disseminate a public
message.11 The Fourth Circuit failed to consider whether WBC’s
speech was the type of harassment described by the Supreme Court
as “fundamentally different from more generally directed means of
communication . . . .”12 There are some places that are especially
protected from targeted verbal confrontation.13 We may soon find
out if the sanctuary traditionally set aside for moments of private
grieving is one of them.

It is a legal commonplace that not all speech warrants constitutional

9
10
11

Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004).
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 498 (1988).
Cf. id. at 486 (focused picketing “do[es] not seek to disseminate a message to the general
public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident, and to do so in an especially offensive way”).
12 Id.
13 See infra Part III.
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protection.14 Not all speech, the Supreme Court has said, “advances
society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on
public issues.”15 Speech involving purely private matters is of “reduced
constitutional value.”16 If such speech were immune to regulation, no
one would be safe from injurious statements with only the most
attenuated constitutional interest. Justice Powell illustrated the point
nicely by observing that if we had a constitutional order that protected
purely private speech, “a woman of impeccable character who was
branded a ‘whore’ by a jealous neighbor” would have no effective legal
recourse.17 But what if the neighbor had said, “This woman, like all
Catholics, is a whore.”? Is this statement constitutionally protected?
Suppose the speaker is a member of a religious group that genuinely
believes all Catholics to be morally prostituted? Suppose the speaker
had said it outside the church where the woman was attending Sunday
morning services? Is the speech protected because, though it targets a
private person, it purports to address a matter of public concern? Or, is
it protected because it is no more than rhetorical hyperbole (though the
speaker means it to be taken as fact), the kind of speech that the Court
once described as a “lusty and imaginative” expression of contempt?18
By no means are these questions likely to lead to easy answers.
But they are, of course, not merely academic queries. WBC is a
religious group that considers the Catholic Church a “whorehouse”
ministered by a priesthood of child molestors.19 For WBC, the threat to
our society represented by the Catholic Church is a matter of the utmost
public concern, and WBC claims the right to call any Catholic a
whore—and to do so with immunity from tort suit. WBC believes the
death of soldiers is to be celebrated as God’s punishment on a tooliberal society, and it claims the right to call any soldier a “fag” whose
death is richly deserved—and to do so with immunity from tort suit.
WBC’s moral judgments are not, to say the least, discriminating: there
are few who would escape its moral condemnation. If WBC can target
private persons under a thin constitutional mantle of public concern, if it
can use hyperbole to shield what is no more that a personally targeted
attack, then it is fair to wonder who among us (no matter how privately
we order our lives) is safe from its injurious speech.
When Marine Lance Corporal Matthew A. Snyder was killed in
Iraq, his funeral, held in Westminster, Maryland, was picketed by
14
15

See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
16 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761.
17 Id. at 761 n.7.
18 Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286
(1974).
19 See
Westboro
Baptist
Church,
Upcoming
Picket
Schedule,
http://www.godhatesfags.com/schedule.html (last visited May 23, 2010).
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WBC.20 The church held signs that read, “You are going to hell,” “God
hates you,” “Thank God for dead soldiers,” and “Semper fi fags.”21
Following the funeral, the church posted on its website
(godhatesfags.com) an “epic” entitled “The Burden of Marine Lance
Cpl. Matthew Snyder.”22 Matthew’s burden, as the church saw it, was
that he had been “raised for the devil” and “taught to defy God.”23
Albert Snyder, Matthew’s father, brought a civil action against WBC in
federal district court, asserting a claim for intentional infliction of
mental and emotional distress (among other causes of action).24 He was
awarded $10.9 million in compensatory and punitive damages.25 That
judgment was reversed by the Fourth Circuit.26
In Snyder v. Phelps, the Fourth Circuit concluded (or seems to
have concluded—its decision is not a model of precision and clarity)
that as long as WBC does not state facts that are provably false, it does
not matter 1) whether the speech at issue is of public or private concern,
or 2) whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure. Unless Mr.
Snyder can prove that WBC acted with actual malice (which a plaintiff
cannot do unless WBC states facts that are provably false), his
emotional distress claim is constitutionally barred. The Supreme Court
has held that “in the area of public debate” expression of opinion
targeted at a public official or figure, however emotionally hurtful, is
constitutionally protected.27 It has been argued that in the area of public
debate expressions of opinion should be protected regardless of the
status of the plaintiff.28 But it has not been seriously suggested that the
First Amendment protects purely personal invective delivered in the
mere milieu of public discourse. The Fourth Circuit comes perilously
close to saying just that. If the Fourth Circuit’s decision stands, Justice
Powell’s impeccable neighbor will be effectively without legal recourse.
I do not think that the Supreme Court intended this. Its concern
for the “essential dignity and worth of every human being” is strong
and longstanding,29 as is its deference to state prerogatives to shape

20
21
22
23
24

Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211-12 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.
Snyder originally brought suit on five counts: defamation, intrusion upon seclusion,
publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy.
Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2008). The district court granted defendants’
motions for summary judgment on the claims for defamation and publicity given to private life.
Id. at 572-73. The court held, however, that the remaining claims raised genuine issues of
material fact. Id. at 573.
25 Id. at 573.
26 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009).
27 Hustler Magazine, v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988).
28 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 40-45 (1971); cf. Deupree v. Iliff, 860
F.2d 300, 304-05 (8th Cir. 1988).
29 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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common-law remedies for attacks on private personality.30 Limits on
tort remedies come at a cost. In Snyder v. Phelps,31 the Supreme
Court has the opportunity to make clear that there are times when the
cost is too high. The Court has said that “personal abuse is not in any
proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded
by the Constitution . . . .”32
This case will test whether that
proposition is good law.
The Court will face a number of murky doctrinal questions. First,
the meaning and scope of the public concern doctrine needs to be
clarified.33 Is it to be the law that “even the intimate and personal
concerns [of private individuals] . . . cannot be said to be outside the
area of ‘public or general concern’”?34 Courts decide whether a concern
is public without reference to the status of the plaintiff. But isn’t the
legitimate public concern whatever connection the plaintiff has to the
matter at issue? Second, the reach of Hustler Magazine v. Falwell35
needs to be delimited. Where a statement is not objectively verifiable,
does Hustler protect speech that is meant to injure private parties? Does
the literal application of the actual malice standard to private plaintiffs
make any sense, let alone properly protect the essential dignity and
worth of every human being? Third, how does the captive audience
doctrine affect the Court’s careful balancing of private and public
interests? The Fourth Circuit could have avoided these questions by
holding that Mr. Snyder failed to prove at trial sufficient evidence to
support his tort claims.36 But the court waded into murky doctrinal
water—and managed to make things even murkier.
Part I of this piece looks briefly at the relevant legal background:
A) the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Falwell v. Flynt37 (the case that
would make it to the Supreme Court as Hustler Magazine v. Falwell 38),
B) the relevant Supreme Court cases, and C) the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in Snyder v. Phelps.39 Part II addresses three arguments likely
30 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (“The legitimate state
interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on
them by defamatory falsehood. We would not lightly require the State to abandon this
purpose . . . .”).
31 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009).
32 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
33 Clarity is long overdue. See Arlen W. Langvardt, Public Concern Revisited: A New Role
for an Old Doctrine in the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 21 VAL. U.L. REV. 241, 270 (1987)
(“If the public concern doctrine called for by the [Dun & Bradstreet] plurality is to be applied by
lower courts in any reasonable and consistent fashion, the Supreme Court must, in future cases,
define the contours of the public concern concept and must enunciate clear standards for
determining when a public concern is present.”).
34 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971).
35 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
36 See 580 F.3d 206, 227-33 (4th Cir. 2009) (Shedd, J., concurring in the judgment).
37 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).
38 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
39 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009).
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to be made by WBC before the Supreme Court, each of which builds on
the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit’s Snyder opinion: A) that this case
involves a matter of public concern; B) that the plaintiff should be
considered a limited purpose public figure; and C) that WBC did not
use language that can be verified as true or false (and, thus, the plaintiff
must show that WBC acted with actual malice). Part III considers the
state’s substantial interest in protecting individuals, especially those
held captive by circumstances, from personally injurious speech, and
argues that the emotional distress tort claim supports that interest
without threatening First Amendment freedoms.
I. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

Falwell v. Flynt: The Fourth Circuit’s Opinion

Left to its own doctrinal devices, the Fourth Circuit probably
would not have read the First Amendment as such a fearsome shield
against speech-based tort suits. More likely, it would have decided that
WBC was adequately protected by the culpability standard of the
common-law emotional distress claim. In Falwell v. Flynt, the Fourth
Circuit had already considered the argument that some emotional
distress claims may be barred under the First Amendment.40 Following
New York Times v. Sullivan,41 the court agreed that Larry Flynt’s parody
ad (in which Jerry Falwell admits that his “first time” was with his
drunken mother42) was entitled to the same level of protection afforded
by the actual malice standard. The court concluded that “[t]o hold
otherwise would frustrate the intent of New York Times and encourage
the type of self censorship which it sought to abolish.”43
But the court did not think that “literal application of the actual
malice standard” was appropriate in an action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.44 It based that judgment on its concern that
“[r]equiring a plaintiff to prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
of the truth in an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
would add a new element to this tort, and alter its nature.”45 For the
Fourth Circuit, the point of the actual malice standard is to focus on the
40
41
42
43

797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
797 F.2d at 1272.
Id. at 1274 (“In the case at bar, Falwell is a public figure, and the gravamen of the suit is a
tortious publication. The defendants are, therefore, entitled to the same level of first amendment
protection in the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress that they received in
Falwell’s claim for libel. To hold otherwise would frustrate the intent of New York Times and
encourage the type of self censorship which it sought to abolish.”).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1275.
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defendant’s culpability; it increases the level of fault the plaintiff must
prove to recover in an action based upon a tortious publication. “The
emphasis of the actual malice standard is ‘knowing . . . or reckless.’”46
The court concluded that this culpability standard is met when the
emotional distress plaintiff proves his case.
The first of the four elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress . . . requires that the defendant’s misconduct be intentional or
reckless. This is precisely the level of fault that New York Times
requires in an action for defamation. The first amendment will not
shield intentional or reckless misconduct resulting in damage to
reputation, and neither will it shield such misconduct which results in
severe emotional distress. We, therefore, hold that when the first
amendment requires application of the actual malice standard, the
stand-ard is met when the jury finds that the defendant’s intentional
or reckless misconduct has proximately caused the injury
complained of. The jury made such a finding here, and thus the
constitutional standard is satisfied.47

The Fourth Circuit knew a legal quandary when it saw one. How
could Falwell show that Larry Flynt published the parody with actual
malice (i.e., knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard of its
falsity) when it was, after all . . . a parody? Literal application of the
actual malice standard would make the emotional distress tort (at least
when based on injurious speech) redundant of defamation claims. The
law provides a remedy for harms caused by speech that no one would
reasonably believe was describing actual facts. Racial slurs may be
actionable on a theory of emotional distress.48 In such a suit, what
would a plaintiff do to satisfy the actual malice standard? Where is the
objectively verifiable assertion? It may be, as courts like to say, that
mere insults ordinarily would not constitute extreme outrage, but one
would think that judgment should be a question for the trier of fact.
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the defendants’ argument that
“since the jury found that a reader could not reasonably believe that the
parody was describing actual facts about Falwell, it must be an opinion
and therefore is protected by the first amendment.”49 For the court,
whether the defendants’ statement constituted opinion is beside the
point when the gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint is infliction of
emotional distress.
46
47
48

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 219 (Cal. 1970). See generally
Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and NameCalling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982). On the constitutionality of laws prohibiting
hate speech, see Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational
Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103, 105 n.3 (1992) (citing articles).
49 Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (4th Cir. 1986).
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At common law the dichotomy between statements of fact and
opinion was often dispositive in actions for defamation. An action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress concerns itself with
intentional or reckless conduct which is outrageous and proximately
causes severe emotional distress, not with statements per se. We
need not consider whether the statements in question constituted
opinion, as the issue is whether their publication was sufficiently
outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The defendants’ argument on this point is, therefore, irrelevant in the
context of this tort.50

Here, the court failed to see a quandary of its own making. We
may regret the ambiguity that keeps jurists so busy ruminating about the
distinction between opinion and fact,51 but the distinction is not
irrelevant for constitutional purposes. Jerry Falwell had already lost his
defamation argument. The jury found that no reasonable person would
believe that the ad parody was describing actual facts.52 The question
before the Fourth Circuit was whether there are circumstances under
which opinion loses its constitutional protection.53
Chastened by the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell,54 the Fourth Circuit (as we shall see below) focused on
objective verifiability when it came to consider WBC’s statements at
Matthew Snyder’s funeral.55 With single-minded attention to the
factualness (rather than the hurtfulness) of the church’s message, the
court looked for evidence to show that no reasonable person could think
the church was asserting provable facts.56 Remarkably, it found that
evidence in the very outrageousness of the church’s speech:
As we have recognized, the “context and tenor” of the speech at
issue, as well as the speaker’s use of “irreverent and indefinite
language,” can serve to negate any impression that he is asserting
actual facts about an individual. . . . The general context of the
50
51

Id. at 1276.
The literature on the fact/opinion distinction is, needless to say, voluminous. For a rich
treatment of the question, see generally Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
52 Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1273.
53 Id. at 1273-76; cf. Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An
Analysis of Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 451-52 (1988) (“[T]he modern protection
for opinion comes not from the elements of the tort of defamation, but from the first amendment.
That the fact/opinion distinction may be irrelevant to the state definition of infliction of emotional
distress does not, therefore, decide the matter. The question is whether it is irrelevant under the
first amendment. The answer provided by Hustler v. Falwell is that the distinction is always
relevant. Opinion is always protected under the first amendment; in fact, its absolute protection is
one of the most pervasive themes of modern first amendment jurisprudence.”) (footnotes
omitted).
54 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
55 See infra Part I.C.
56 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 222-26 (4th Cir. 2009).
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speech in this proceeding is one of impassioned (and highly
offensive) protest, with the speech at issue conveyed on handheld
placards. A distasteful protest sign . . . is not the medium through
which a reasonable reader would expect a speaker to communicate
objectively verifiable facts.57

It is an odd state of affairs when the message of WBC is described
as irreverent. Certainly, the church thought it was conveying actual
facts about the plaintiff’s religious standing. That aside, the Fourth
Circuit seems to be saying that there are no circumstances under which
opinion loses its constitutional protection. But that outcome would not
be consistent with the careful, if sometimes rather subtle, balancing of
interests that has driven the Supreme Court’s consideration of speechbased tort claims.
B. Supreme Court Precedent: Balancing Public and Private Interests
The Supreme Court has never heeded Justice Black’s admonition
that “no law” means no law “without any ‘ifs’ or ‘buts’ or
‘whereases.’”58 And for good reason. Other values can be threatened
by the talismanic invocation of free speech rights. Free speech always
comes at a cost. The question is: When is the cost too high?
Since 1964, the Court has carefully measured the competing
weights of public discourse and private personality. The actual malice
standard was stable doctrine when it applied to public officials (New
York Times v. Sullivan, 196459) and public figures (Curtis
Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 196760). Though not quite a bright line, the public
official/figure standard was bright enough, heightening constitutional
review for media criticism of those who are “intimately involved in the
resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame,
shape events in areas of concern to society at large.”61 When the Court
turned its attention to defamation actions brought by private plaintiffs
involving statements of public concern (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
197462), the issue was initially in doubt. Justice Brennan had previously
argued that New York Times protection should extend to defamatory
falsehoods relating to private persons if the statements were matters of
public concern (Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 197163). For
Brennan, the prevailing interest was society’s need to learn about
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 224 (internal citation omitted).
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
Id. at 164 (Warren, J., concurring in judgment).
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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matters of public moment: “If a matter is a subject of public or general
interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private
individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not
‘voluntarily’ choose to become involved.”64
Ultimately, the Gertz Court concluded that the balance of
competing interests weighed against application of the actual malice
standard in cases involving private plaintiffs.65 Such a categorical
privilege for matters of public concern would leave private persons—no
matter how attenuated or involuntary their association with some matter
of public concern—with no recourse for injury unless they could satisfy
the demanding actual malice standard. The Court observed that public
officials and public figures 1) have the opportunity to counteract false
statements, and 2) must accept the consequences of their (usually
voluntary) involvement in public affairs.66 But it would be unfair to
make these assumptions with regard to a private individual.
He has not accepted public office or assumed an “influential role in
ordering society.” . . . He has relinquished no part of his interest in
the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a
more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by
defamatory falsehood. Thus, private individuals are not only more
vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are
also more deserving of recovery.67

Having distinguished “the state interest in compensating private
individuals from the analogous interest involved in the context of public
persons,”68 the Court created a less demanding constitutional standard
for suits brought by a private plaintiff on a matter of public concern.
The Court concluded that the plaintiff has the burden of proving some
level of fault before recovering damages, but that states “may define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability . . . .”69 Subsequently,
the Court rejected the common-law rule on falsity—that the defendant
must bear the burden of proving truth—in cases where the plaintiff is a
private figure and the speech is of public concern (Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 198670). Under Hepps, the private plaintiff
must bear the burden of proving falsity as well as fault.71 With these
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 43.
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Id. at 344-45.
Id. at 345 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 346.
Id. at 347. The Court also decided that states could permit private plaintiffs to recover
presumed or punitive damages only upon a showing of actual malice. See id. at 348-50.
70 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
71 Id. at 776 (“We believe that the common law’s rule on falsity—that the defendant must
bear the burden of proving truth—must similarly fall here to a constitutional requirement that the
plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages.”).
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constitutional bulwarks in place, traditional common-law defamation
principles obtain only where the plaintiff is a private figure and the
speech is not a matter of public concern (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 198572).
In the New York Times-Gertz line of cases, the Court created
culpability requirements to ensure robust debate on public issues. Such
cases would involve statements (on a matter of public concern) that
reasonably imply a false and defamatory fact. In a separate line of
cases, the Court fashioned constitutional protection for statements of
public concern that do not contain a provably false factual connotation
(Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 1970;73 Old Dominion
Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 1974;74
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 199075). Where a statement relating to
matters of public concern could not reasonably be interpreted as making
a factual inference, it would receive full constitutional protection (at
least where the plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant).76
Here, the Court wandered deeply into the land of fine distinctions.
Thus, the statement “Mayor Jones is a liar” might be actionable, but the
statement “Mayor Jones shows his abysmal ignorance when discussing
the teachings of Marx and Lenin” would not be actionable because it
does not contain a provably false factual connotation.77 Who can plumb
the depths of Mayor Jones’ ignorance? But what about the statement,
“Mayor Jones accepts the teachings of Marx and Lenin”? Whether this
is provable is, I think, anybody’s guess.
The Court also provided New York Times constitutional protection
against emotional distress claims in the area of public debate about
public figures (Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 198878). In effect, the
Court has created something close to a categorical privilege for
statements on matters of public concern unless they are provably false.79
The Hustler Court did not say whether statements of public concern are
shielded from emotional distress claims where the plaintiff is a private
figure (or, for that matter, whether statements not of public concern are

72
73
74
75
76

472 U.S. 749 (1985).
398 U.S. 6 (1970).
418 U.S. 264 (1974).
497 U.S. 1 (1990).
See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (“Hepps ensures that a statement of opinion relating to
matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive
full constitutional protection.”).
77 See id.; cf., e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1000 (1984) (“A statement that, on its
face and standing alone, sounds like an assertion of fact may not be actionable. Context is crucial
and can turn what, out of context, appears to be a statement of fact into ‘rhetorical hyperbole,’
which is not actionable.”).
78 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988).
79 The Supreme Court has not yet “addressed the question of whether the constitutional
protections afforded to statements not provably false should apply with equal force to both media
and nonmedia defendants.” Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 219 n.13 (4th Cir. 2009).
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shielded from emotional distress claims where the plaintiff is a public
official or figure), and, if so, what level of protection they would get.80
More generally, the Court has chosen to see the status of the plaintiff
(i.e., whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure) and the content
of the defendant’s speech (i.e., whether the speech is of public concern)
as two separate forces shaping the common-law landscape.81 The Court
has doubted the wisdom of letting judges “decide on an ad hoc basis
which publications address issues of ‘general or public interest’ and
which do not,”82 but it has precious little wisdom of its own to offer on
this subject. Thus, the Court has left some important doctrinal doors
ajar—through which defendants like WBC can blithely march under the
banner of free speech.
C. Snyder v. Phelps: The Fourth Circuit Once More
In its Snyder v. Phelps decision, the Fourth Circuit rebuked the
district court for its focus on the status of the plaintiff.83 The district
court determined that Matthew Snyder was not a public figure, that his
funeral was not a public event, and that “[d]efendants [could not] by
their own actions transform a private funeral into a public event and
then bootstrap their position by arguing that Matthew Snyder was a
public figure.”84 For the district court, this case was simply a commonlaw tort claim where 1) the defendants’ speech was directed against
private individuals, and 2) the subject of the lawsuit was a matter of
private concern. The plaintiff, accordingly, could recover damages
without clearing any constitutional hurdles.
For the Fourth Circuit, the conclusion that the Snyders were not
private figures “did not dispose of the Defendants’ First Amendment
contentions.”85 In the view of the circuit court, the district court “failed
to assess whether the pertinent statements could reasonably be
interpreted as asserting ‘actual facts’ about an individual, or whether
they instead merely contained rhetorical hyperbole.”86 The district
court, in other words, had looked at the wrong line of Supreme Court
cases. It should have focused on the type of speech at issue (i.e.,
80 For a multi-tiered approach to the question of constitutional protection where the plaintiff
claims emotional distress based on speech, see Smolla, supra note 53, at 466-74.
81 See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986) (“One can discern
in these decisions two forces that may reshape the common-law landscape to conform to the First
Amendment. The first is whether the plaintiff is a public official or figure, or is instead a private
figure. The second is whether the speech at issue is of public concern.”).
82 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
83 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 222 (4th Cir. 2009).
84 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (D. Md. 2008).
85 580 F.3d at 222.
86 Id.
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whether it was a matter of public concern, whether it was objectively
verifiable), not on the status of the Snyders or the circumstances
surrounding Matthew’s funeral.87
The Fourth Circuit simply ignored the status of the plaintiff. It
began its analysis by considering whether WBC’s speech was a matter
of public concern. The court first looked at a group of signs that, it
assumed, were not about the Snyders—that is, they were a matter of
public concern.
The following signs displayed by the Defendants, which are similar
in both their message and syntax, can readily be assessed together:
“America is Doomed,” “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,”
“Pope in Hell,” “Fag Troops,” “Semper Fi Fags,” “Thank God for
Dead Soldiers,” “Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,”
“Priests Rape Boys,” and “God Hates Fags.” As a threshold matter,
as utterly distasteful as these signs are, they involve matters of public
concern, including the issue of homosexuals in the military, the sexabuse scandal within the Catholic Church, and the political and
moral conduct of the United States and its citizens.88

Next, the court noted that some signs could be construed as mere
personal abuse. Two signs—”You’re Going to Hell” and “God Hates
You”—could reasonably be read as referring to “Snyder or his son
only . . . .”89 But as it turns out, it made no difference to the Court
whether the signs were targeted personally at Mr. Snyder or his son, for
none of the signs could be reasonably read to assert “actual and
provable facts.”90 Whether personal or not, the signs were “incapable of
objective verification.”91 What did matter—the only thing that
mattered—to the court was WBC’s use of “rhetorical hyperbole and
figurative expression.”92 The use of such “irreverent and indefinite”
language negated any impression that WBC was trying to state
objectively verifiable facts.93
87 See id. at 222 (“The Supreme Court has created a separate line of First Amendment
precedent that is specifically concerned with the constitutional protections afforded to certain
types of speech, and that does not depend upon the public or private status of the speech’s
target.”).
88 Id. at 222-23 (footnote omitted).
89 Id. at 224.
90 Id. at 224; see also id. (“We need not resolve this question of usage, however, because a
reasonable reader would not interpret the statements on these two signs as asserting actual and
provable facts. Whether an individual is ‘Going to Hell’ or whether God approves of someone’s
character could not possibly be subject to objective verification. Thus, even if the reasonable
reader understood the ‘you’ in these signs to refer to Snyder or his son, no such reader would
understand those statements (‘You’re Going to Hell’ and ‘God Hates You’) to assert provable
facts about either of them.”).
91 Id. at 223.
92 Id. at 224.
93 Id.
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When the court turned to the “Epic” published on WBC’s website,
it had already decided that the protest was a matter of public concern
(and that whether it was public or not didn’t much matter, anyway). It
was of no significance that WBC was protesting this funeral, the funeral
of Matthew Snyder. The Epic occasioned no second thoughts on the
court’s behalf despite these facts:
1. The Epic was titled “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl.
Matthew A. Snyder.”94
2. The Epic discusses Matthew’s life in great, if delusional,
personal detail. This is the Fourth Circuit’s description of the Epic:
“Twenty years ago, little Matthew Snyder came into the world. . . .
God created him and loaned/entrusted him to Albert and Julie
Snyder.” . . . The Epic states that the Snyders “had a DUTY to
prepare that child to serve the LORD his GOD-PERIOD! You did
JUST THE OPPOSITE-you raised him for the devil. You taught him
that God was a liar.” . . . The Epic also focuses on Matthew’s
upbringing, asserting that “Albert and Julie . . . taught Matthew to
defy his Creator, to divorce, and to commit adultery. They taught
him how to support the largest pedophile machine in the history of
the entire world, the Roman Catholic monstrosity. . . . They also, in
supporting satanic Catholicism, taught Matthew to be an
idolater.” . . . After interspersing additional excerpts from the Bible,
the Epic refers to Matthew’s service in the military, noting that he
fought for
the United States of Sodom, a filthy country that is in lock step
with his evil, wicked[,] and sinful manner of life, putting him in
the cross hairs of a God that is so mad He has smoke coming
from his nostrils and fire from his mouth! How dumb was
that?95

3. The Epic makes only the most fanciful connection between
Matthew and WBC’s public concerns. From the WBC’s Epic:
God rose up Matthew for the very purpose of striking him down, so
that God’s name might be declared throughout all the earth. He
killed Matthew so that His servants would have an opportunity to
preach His words to the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, the
Maryland Legislature, and the whorehouse called St. John Catholic
Church at Westminster where Matthew Snyder fulfilled his calling.96

94
95
96

Id.
Id. at 225 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
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Whether Matthew’s upbringing is of substantial public interest, as
WBC contends, or a purely private matter made no difference to the
court. It rested its judgment on the conclusion that 1) “the Epic cannot
be divorced from the general context of the funeral protest,” and 2) “it is
patterned after the hyperbolic and figurative language used on the
various signs.”97 On the latter count, WBC had going for it—in the
court’s estimation—a general distastefulness and a lack of concern for
grammatical niceties.
[T]he Defendants interspersed strong, figurative language with
verses from the Bible. They utilized distasteful and offensive words,
atypical capitalization, and exaggerated punctuation, all of which
suggest the work of a hysterical protestor rather than an objective
reporter of facts.98

Since “[t]he general tenor of the Epic . . . serves to negate any
impression that it was the source of any actual facts,” it could not be
about the Snyders.99 It had to be “primarily concerned with the
Defendants’ strongly held views on matters of public concern.”100
The court seems to be creating a constitutional catch-22. If WBC’s
speech is not about the Snyders, it is protected as a matter of public
concern; but if WBC’s speech is about the Snyders (and thus is not a
matter of public concern), it is protected as hyperbolic rhetoric. The
bottom line seems to be this: Mr. Snyder’s claim of emotional injury is
only viable if WBC speaks as an objective reporter of facts. If affirmed,
this would be a strong doctrinal brew. Concocted by the Supreme Court,
such protection against speech-based emotional distress claims was meant
to give breathing space for contentious speech about public official and
figures.101 To support its position, the Fourth Circuit quoted the Supreme
Court’s decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut: “To persuade others to his
own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to
exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in
church or state . . . .”102 This is strange support, unless one ignores the
concluding qualifying phrase: “[O]f men who have been, or are,
97
98
99
100
101

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (“The sort of robust political debate
encouraged by the First Amendment is bound to produce speech that is critical of those who hold
public office or those public figures who are ‘intimately involved in the resolution of important
public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.”)
(quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in the
judgment)).
102 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
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prominent in church or state . . . .”103 Mr. Snyder is prominent in
neither, of course.
Cantwell is instructive for another reason. There, the Court
reasoned that no breach of the peace had occurred because Cantwell 1)
used no coercive means to spread his message,104 and 2) used no
personal abuse “intended to insult or affront the hearers . . . .”105 Of
particular importance to the Court was the evidence that Cantwell
sought to persuade “willing listener[s]” and that his advocacy involved
“no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse.”106
On these facts, the Court found that Cantwell “had invaded no right or
interest . . . of the men accosted.”107 The Court hastened to distinguish
speech that would amount to a breach of the peace because it “consisted
of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks directed to the person of the
hearer.”108 The Supreme Court has said that targeted speech (as
opposed to abstract advocacy) may be subject to reasonable restrictions,
but the Fourth Circuit did not consider whether WBC’s protest was this
type of speech: personally provocative, directed to a captive audience,
and motivated by a desire to cause that audience psychological distress.
The question of whether WBC’s speech was of legitimate public
concern ought not to be answered without reference to the privacy
interests of the plaintiffs; and the question of whether WBC’s protest
“serve[d] a reasonable communicative purpose”109 ought not to be
answered without reference to the state’s strong interest in protecting
private parties from emotionally injurious speech.
II. UNDER THE BANNER OF FREE SPEECH: WBC’S LINE OF DEFENSE
WBC made productive use of the Fourth Circuit’s handiwork. Its
“Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari” anticipates its
position before the Supreme Court, building on doctrinal ambiguities to
argue that: A) this case involves matters of vital public interest; B) Mr.
103
104
105
106
107
108

Id. (emphasis added).
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 301, 308 (1940).
Id. at 309.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 309 (“One may, however, be guilty of [breach of the peace] if he commit acts or
make statements likely to provoke violence and disturbance of good order, even though no such
eventuality be intended. Decisions to this effect are many, but examination discloses that, in
practically all, the provocative language which was held to amount to a breach of the peace
consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks directed to the person of the hearer.”)
(emphasis added); cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (“While the four-letter word
displayed by Cohen in relation to the draft is not uncommonly employed in a personally
provocative fashion, in this instance it was clearly not ‘directed to the person of the hearer.’”
(quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309)).
109 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 499 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Snyder is a limited purpose public figure; and C) WBC did not use
language that can be verified as true or false (and, thus, Mr. Snyder
must show that WBC acted with actual malice).110 If nothing more,
these arguments call for greater doctrinal definition and coherence from
the Supreme Court. But given the consequences that would arise if
WBC’s arguments prevail, the Court should do more. It needs to decide
what limit states can set on intentionally injurious speech; it needs to
define how broadly the common law protects the dignity and worth of
every human being.
A. WBC argues that this case involves matters of vital public
interest.
For WBC, the matter of public concern is the same for all its
protests: “how God is dealing with this nation . . . .”111 Of course, there
are more direct manifestations of God’s judgment that form the specific
content of WBC’s message:
Of greatest importance is the fact that the speech at issue was speech
on public issues. That fact cannot be gainsaid, because the topics
were the dying soldiers, homosexuality in the military, the sex-abuse
scandal in the Catholic Church, and the morals of this nation. Given
the magnitude and gravity of the problems facing this once-great
nation, nothing could be more important at this hour than the
question of how God is dealing with this nation, especially on the
battlefield.112

But this reasoning, accepted without discussion by the Fourth
Circuit, mistakes any public concern for the kind of concern that has
traditionally shielded plaintiffs from speech-based tort claims. The
Supreme Court looks for a demonstrable connection between the
plaintiff and some matter of public interest. The defendant must be able
to argue, credibly, that, given the “content, form, and context” of its
message,113 there is something about this plaintiff that “requires special
protection to ensure that ‘debate on public issues [will] be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open.’”114 The reality is that there are not two separate
forces shaping the common-law landscape. The status of the plaintiff
and the content of the defendant’s speech are as inseparable as the
110 Brief in Opposition to Petition of Writ of Certiorari at 14-19, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751
(U.S. Jan. 20, 2010), 2010 WL 271323.
111 Id. at 15.
112 Id.
113 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (quoting
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
114 Id. at 762 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
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dancer from the dance.
Case after case illustrates the point that WBC’s speech is protected
only if the conduct of Matthew Snyder is of legitimate public concern.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,115 the plaintiff was accused of being part
of a dangerous communist conspiracy. Elmer Gertz was neither a public
official nor a public figure. The question before the Supreme Court was
“whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory
falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a
public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against liability for
the injury inflicted by those statements.”116 The answer would turn out
to be that a media defendant does enjoy some degree of constitutional
protection. Of critical significance to the Court was the fact that the
case “involved expression on a matter of undoubted public concern.”117
That concern was not whether there was a communist conspiracy that
threatened the United States. Or whether lawyers (Gertz was an
attorney) were bad people. The concern was whether Elmer Gertz was
a “Communist-fronter” and whether, as part of a communist conspiracy,
he had worked to “frame” a Chicago policeman who was being
prosecuted for homicide.118 In short, Gertz had been “linked” to
Communist activity. Had the concern been defined more broadly—say,
the role of lawyers as a front for a communist conspiracy—the
defendant could have targeted any lawyer. The “link” would not have
been needed, and no lawyer, no matter how far removed from things
public (or communistic), would have been safe from the accusation that
he was a menace to the nation.
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, the Supreme Court refused to equate
“public controversy” for defamation purposes with all controversies of
interest to the public.119 The lurid details of Mary Alice Firestone’s
divorce proceedings (which were described by the Florida Supreme
Court as a “cause celebre”) were not the “sort of ‘public controversy’
referred to in Gertz, even though the marital difficulties of extremely
wealthy individuals may be of interest to some portion of the reading
public.”120 Under the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, the defendant could
have manufactured a public controversy by discussing the sad state of
modern marriage, or the erotic zest of celebrity satyrs, or who knows
what. Provided that the defendant had spoken in terms so outrageous
they would not be objectively verifiable, Ms. Firestone would have had
no cause of action.
In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association, Inc. v.
115
116
117
118
119
120

418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Id. at 332.
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 756 (emphasis added).
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 326.
424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
Id.
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Bresler,121 the matter of public concern was whether the plaintiff’s
negotiating positions amounted to “blackmail,” not sordid doings in the
world of zoning variances; in Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Association,
Inc.,122 the public concern was whether the plaintiff was a spy, not the
threat of Soviet espionage; in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps,123 whether the plaintiff “had links to organized crime”124 was the
matter of public concern; and in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,125 the
question of public interest was whether the plaintiff had perjured
himself, not violence in high-school athletics. Even the Rosenbloom
plurality, which sought to extend constitutional protection to all matters
of public concern without regard to the plaintiff’s status, insisted that
“the public focus is on the conduct of the participant [i.e., the plaintiff]
and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct . . . .”126
None of these cases suggests that the subjective and unilateral
assertions of the defendant are sufficient to make any issue a matter of
legitimate concern to the public. WBC must show that the content,
effect, and significance of Matthew Snyder’s conduct requires special
protection to ensure robust public debate. Of course, it can make no
such showing. Or, to put it another way, it could make the same
showing about every soldier. But soldiers, just because they are
soldiers, cannot be dragged into the public arena on the premise that the
military conflict of which they are a part (or something even vaguer) is
a public concern. Otherwise, no soldier is safe from personal verbal
assault. The only aspect of Matthew Snyder’s conduct that bears some
connection to WBC’s concerns was his military service. Though the
significance of that conduct cannot be underestimated, it does not have
a public focus. The significance of his death belongs to those who now
wish to be let alone to mourn Matthew and honor his sacrifice.
B. WBC argues that “there is a viable basis for concluding
that [Mr. Snyder] is a limited purpose public figure.”127
Perhaps this argument is not meant to be taken seriously. Support
121
122
123
124
125
126

398 U.S. 6 (1970).
443 U.S. 157 (1979).
475 U.S. 767 (1986).
Id. at 769.
497 U.S. 1 (1990).
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971). In Rosenbloom, there was no
disagreement that the plaintiff was “involved in matters of public or general concern.” Id. at 48.
It did not matter to the Court “[w]hether the person involved is a famous large-scale magazine
distributor or a ‘private’ businessman running a corner newsstand . . . .” Id. at 43. I disagree that
the status of the plaintiff “has no relevance in ascertaining whether the public has an interest in
the issue.” Id. But at least Mr. Rosenbloom was, in the Court’s judgment, involved in a matter of
public concern. Even this much cannot be said of Matthew Snyder.
127 Brief in Opposition to Petition of Writ of Certiorari at 19, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751
(U.S. Jan. 20, 2010), 2010 WL 271323.
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for the contention is a bit far-fetched:
* Mr. Snyder “chose to have the funeral at a Catholic church,
knowing the public’s attention on this sex-abuse scandal.”128
* “Petitioner’s son voluntarily enlisted knowing the war in Iraq
was of national importance and interest.”129
* “Petitioner spoke with the media about his son, attempting to
influence the public to believe his son was a hero.”130
But the evidence brought forward by WBC illustrates how easy it
is to erode delicate doctrinal distinctions between the public and private
spheres. For WBC’s argument depends on the Fourth Circuit’s ready
acceptance that, regardless of the plaintiff’s conduct, issues of public
import are necessarily of legitimate public concern in the context of tort
suits. WBC would establish this equation: the more likely that speech is
a matter of public concern, the less likely that the plaintiff is a private
figure. The content of the defendant’s speech would determine how the
court understands the status of the plaintiff. But the Supreme Court has
rejected the proposition that “mere newsworthiness” justifies the
application of the New York Times standard to private plaintiffs.131 “A
private individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure
just by becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts
public attention.”132 It is the “nature and extent of an individual’s
participation in the particular controversy” that determines the status of
the plaintiff.133 So, the equation ought to be this: the more private a
figure the plaintiff is, the less likely that speech about him is a matter of
public concern.134 The status of the plaintiff should determine how the
court understands the content of the defendant’s speech.
If the latter equation is right, then WBC’s speech has no legitimate
public interest, for the Snyders are purely private figures. Elmer Gertz
was a private figure “even though he voluntarily associated himself with
a case that was certain to receive extensive media exposure.”135 Ilya
Wolston was a private figure even though he “voluntarily chose not to
appear before the grand jury [investigating Soviet intelligence activity],
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979).
Id.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
Cf. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749, 781 n.5 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Speech allegedly defaming a private person will generally be far less
likely to implicate matters of public importance than will speech allegedly defaming public
officials or public figures.”).
135 Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167.
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knowing that his action might be attended by publicity . . . .”136 The
public attention that Matthew’s funeral attracted does not make his
father a public figure. Mary Alice Firestone was not a public figure
even though her divorce was a “cause celebre.”137 Whatever publicity
Matthew’s funeral occasioned, Mr. Snyder did not “engage[] the
attention of the public in an attempt to influence the resolution of the
issues involved.”138 The fact that he spoke to the media does not
suggest that he “sought to use the press conferences as a vehicle by
which to thrust [himself] to the forefront of some unrelated controversy
in order to influence its resolution.”139
Indeed, Mr. Snyder was thrust into the glare of public controversy.
The Court has said that “those charged with defamation cannot, by their
own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public
figure.”140 But, as the district court concluded, it was the WBC defendants
who thrust the Snyder family into the unwelcome glare of national media
coverage, “transform[ing] a private funeral into a public event . . . .”141
The district court rightly rejected WBC’s attempt to “bootstrap [its]
position by arguing that Matthew Snyder was a public figure.”142
*

*

*

The connection between Mr. Snyder and the topics of concern to
WBC is too attenuated to justify constitutional protection for speech
that amounts to no more than a personal attack. WBC targeted a private
figure for emotional injury; it clothed personal abuse in the dress of
public concern. Whatever social value, if any, may be derived from
WBC’s speech is far outweighed by the state’s interest in protecting
private individuals from this kind of unprompted verbal attack.
C. WBC argues that it did not use language that can be
verified as true or false. Thus, Mr. Snyder must show that
WBC acted with actual malice.
As a matter of religious principle, WBC ought forcefully to reject
the notion that it does not mean what it says, but it takes refuge in the
proposition that the more “hyperbolic” its speech (the more its
religious viewpoint is reduced to rhetorical show), the more it is
constitutionally protected.
136
137
138
139
140

Id.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351).
Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 454 n.3.
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979); see also Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167-168;
Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 454-55.
141 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (D. Md. 2008).
142 Id.
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[T]he Fourth Circuit was correct in finding that the language of
respondents is not language which can be verified as true or
false. . . . The rule of law about hyperbolic and objectively
unverifiable language being protected is well-established, and does
not need to be revisited . . . .143

If the Fourth Circuit’s judgment is affirmed, groups like WBC will
be encouraged to be as distasteful as possible. To protect themselves,
such groups need only disguise personally derogatory language as
public discourse and redouble their rhetorical efforts. Though it is hard
to imagine how WBC could do that, it hardly needs the invitation.
If there is something unseemly in WBC’s willingness to concede,
if only for the sake of argument, that its message was rhetorical
hyperbole, there is something downright offensive about the
condescension with which the Fourth Circuit treats WBC and its
message. Why would a reasonable reader take as rhetorically
hyperbolic WBC’s description of the Catholic Church as a “pedophile
machine”?144 Perhaps the reasonable reader would understand that
some of WBC’s assertions about the Catholic Church (or the United
States, or Matthew Snyder, ) do not contain demonstrable facts, but they
are certainly assertions that WBC thought were factual and presented as
true. It is almost as though the court were treating WBC’s protest as
some sort of religious parody, as though it ought to be accompanied (as
was the Falwell parody ad) with a disclaimer that the message was not
meant to be taken seriously. Because WBC’s message is not verifiable,
it cannot be the basis of a defamation claim, but whether WBC meant
what it said and meant that message to cause emotional distress—that
should be taken seriously. WBC’s intent is relevant not only to the
merits of Mr. Snyder’s tort claim but to the question of whether that
claim ought to be constitutionally barred.
The Fourth Circuit was wrong when it stated that adjudicating a
claim for emotional distress did not require consideration of whether
the defendant’s statement is opinion or fact. Where the plaintiff is a
public official or figure, opinion on matters of public concern warrants
constitutional protection. But where the private plaintiff brings an
emotional distress claim, a different constitutional calculus is
appropriate: the state’s interest in the protection of private personality
is greater, and the value of First Amendment protection is lesser. In
defamation cases, a lack of objective verifiability lessens the plaintiff’s
reputational or dignitary injury. No one will believe matters that are
not provably true or false. In emotional distress cases, however,
143 Brief in Opposition to Petition of Writ of Certiorari at 21-22, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751
(U.S. Jan. 20, 2010), 2010 WL 271323.
144 See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2009).
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rhetorical hyperbole may serve to heighten the psychological injury,
whether people believe the defendant’s message or not. Further, the
state has a compelling interest in the protection of truthful statements;
if some meritorious suits fail because the plaintiff cannot prove falsity,
that is a cost we pay to ensure robust public debate.145 But the state has
no interest in the protection of statements that are meant to wound
private plaintiffs. The speech-based emotional distress suit does not
operate to restrict public discourse; it restricts only the use of speech to
inflict injury, the use of words as weapons.146 Mr. Snyder did not bring
suit to stop WBC from spreading its message. He brought suit to stop
the church from using its speech to target him for injury—at a time
when he was likely to be especially vulnerable to and unable to avoid
the attack.147 If a private plaintiff can show common-law malice—that
is, that the defendant intentionally or recklessly caused emotional
distress—the constitutional standard ought to be satisfied (and, thus, in
a roundabout way, the Fourth Circuit got it right when it found that
Falwell’s suit was not constitutionally barred). Hustler may create
“breathing space” for robust debate about public affairs, but the literal
application of the actual malice standard would leave private plaintiffs
helpless against malicious speakers. The victim of a libel gets a chance
to show that the statement was false. The victim of rhetorical
hyperbole can prove or disprove nothing that will bring judicial
redress. Indeed, the standard invites malicious speakers to greater
heights of hysterical protest.
There is no justification for applying the actual malice standard
outside the public arena. (And little enough inside the public arena.
Why not just bar speech-based emotional distress suits against public
officials and figures? Who would reasonably think that Jerry Falwell’s
“first time” was a drunken tryst with his mother in an outhouse. And
how would Falwell prove that Hustler acted with actual malice? It
would be more than a bit ludicrous for him to argue that, in fact, it was
not his first time—and Larry Flynt knew it!) The Supreme Court was
probably right to decide that a public figure ought not to recover
damages for emotional harm based on statements that are not
145 Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (“[E]rroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate . . . .”) (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
146 See Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1276 (4th Cir. 1986) (“An action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress concerns itself with intentional or reckless conduct which is
outrageous and proximately causes severe emotional distress, not with statements per se.”); see
also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000) (Indeed, “[i]t may not be the content of the
speech, as much as the deliberate ‘verbal or visual assault,’ that justifies proscription.” (quoting
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 n.6 (1975) (citation and brackets omitted));
cf. J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2307 (1999)
(“[S]peech used to create a hostile working environment is unprotected not because of its content,
but because in the social context in which it occurs, it is used a method of employment
discrimination.”).
147 See infra Part III.
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objectively verifiable. The First Amendment shields “many things done
with motives that are less than admirable . . . in the area of public debate
about public figures.”148 But the Court should have stopped there. The
actual malice standard offers no viable defense to the kinds of
statements that inflict emotional distress. Its literal application would
be, as Rodney Smolla says, “nonsensical.”149 Perhaps Jerry Falwell
should be made to take it, but public debate will be just as robust if
private plaintiffs have legal recourse for intentionally injurious
speech.150 Where the plaintiff has no connection to the public fray, the
state’s interest in protecting private personality should pierce the First
Amendment shield.
III. SNYDER V. PHELPS: WEIGHING THE INTERESTS
The Supreme Court has spoken eloquently about “the interests
decent people have for those whom they have lost.”151 This privacy
interest is, of course, a deeply personal one. “Family members have a
personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to
unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief,
tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the
deceased person who was once their own.”152 But the state, too, has a
significant stake in ensuring the survival of “well-established cultural
tradition[s]” that signify “the respect a society shows for the deceased
and for the surviving family members.”153
The state has a broader interest in protecting individuals made
vulnerable by circumstances to unwanted speech. Though “‘we are
often “captives” outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to
148
149

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988).
See Smolla, supra note 53, at 439 (“The term ‘actual malice,’ as used in New York Times,
is nonsensical when applied mechanically to the emotional distress claim in Falwell. One cannot
speak meaningfully about the publisher’s subjective doubt as to truth or falsity when neither the
initial decisionmaking process of the publisher nor the subsequent injury to the plaintiff has
anything to do with the truth or falsity of the communication, or with its capacity to inflict
reputational damage.”).
150 Cf. State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 56 (Alaska 2007) (“Heightened First Amendment
protection does not extend to IIED claims based on speech that is not about a public figure or
about a matter of public concern.”); Van Duyn v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 1005, 1011 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988) (“Our review of Hustler Magazine leads us to believe that the court’s primary concern was
with public officials and public figures. Nowhere did the court indicate that its holding applied to
private individuals. Although we do not discount defendant’s right to free speech under the First
Amendment, we do not read Hustler Magazine as requiring proof of an additional element to the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress where the plaintiff is a private individual.”). But
see Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300, 304-05 (8th Cir. 1988) (“We believe ‘expressions of opinion
are protected whether the subject of the comment is a private or public figure.’”) (quoting
Ollmann v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
151 Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004).
152 Id.
153 Id.
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objectionable speech,”‘ the constitutional commitment to open
discourse “does not mean we must be captives everywhere.”154 The
Supreme Court has unhesitatingly protected the “unwilling listener”
when protesters invade residential privacy.
[A] special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own
walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid
intrusions. Thus, we have repeatedly held that individuals are not
required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that
the government may protect this freedom.155

By analogy, the Supreme Court has applied the state’s interest in
residential privacy to medical privacy,156 and the doctrine has been
extended by lower courts to houses of worship157 and funerals.158 The
154 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397
U.S. 728, 738 (1970)).
155 Id. at 484-85.
156 See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (citing Operation
Rescue v. Women’s Health Ctr. Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 672 (Fla. 1993) (“We conclude that the
reasoning underlying this government interest in residential privacy applies even more
convincingly to the state interest in ensuring medical privacy.”)); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530
U.S. 703 (2000); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); cf. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (persons confronted with defendant’s jacket bearing the words “Fuck the
Draft” could have avoided “further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their
eyes”); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1207 (7th
Cir. 1978) (residents could “simply avoid” Nazi-affiliated party protest activities).
157 St. David’s Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, 921 P.2d 821, 830 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1996) (“[I]n addition to the government interest in protecting residential and clinical
privacy, the government has a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of one’s place of
worship as well.”); cf. Tompkins v. Cyr, 995 F. Supp. 664, 681 n.10 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (“The
Court is troubled by the notion that a person may be subjected to focused picketing at their place
of worship. Indeed, the right to engage in quiet and reflective prayer without being subjected to
unwarranted intrusion is an essential component of freedom of religion. The government certainly
has a significant interest in protecting this important First Amendment right.”). But see Olmer v.
City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176, 1182 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Allowing other locations, even churches,
to claim the same level of constitutionally protected privacy [as residences] would, we think,
permit government to prohibit too much speech and other communication.”).
158 See Phelps-Roper v. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d 612, 619 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (“Because the
mourners are a captive audience unable to avoid communications simply by averting their eyes,
the Court finds that the State of Ohio has a significant interest in protecting its citizens from
disruption during the events associated with a funeral or burial service.”); McQueary v. Stumbo,
453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 992 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (“A funeral is a deeply personal, emotional and solemn
occasion. Its attendees have an interest in avoiding unwanted, obtrusive communications which
is at least similar to a person’s interest in avoiding such communications inside his home.
Further, like medical patients entering a medical facility, funeral attendees are captive.”); cf. Nat’l
Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004) (“Family members have a
personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted public
exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they
seek to accord to the deceased person who was once their own.”). But see Phelps-Roper v.
Nixon, 509 F.3d 480, 486-87 (8th Cir. 2007) (no significant state interest in protecting funeral
attendees). See generally Christina E. Wells, Privacy and Funeral Protests, 87 N.C. L. REV. 151
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Supreme Court has been especially severe with targeted or “focused
picketing,”159 which the Court considers “fundamentally different from
more generally directed means of communication . . . .”160 Targeted
picketing “generally do[es] not seek to disseminate a message to the
general public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident, and to do so in
an especially offensive way.”161 Even when protesters do have a
communicative purpose, however, their activity may “inherently”
intrude on privacy.162 The home becomes something less than a home
under the “tensions and pressures” created by knowledge of protest
outside the door.163 Indeed, these psychological pressures can have a
“devastating effect” on our peace and privacy.164
It is always a bad business when rights collide. In the pantheon of
rights, freedom of speech may have a preferred position, but it is no
license to disregard the rights of others.165 Supported by the “very basic
right to be free from sights, sounds, and tangible matter we do not
(2008); Amanda Asbury, Note, Finding Rest in Peace and Not in Speech: The Government’s
Interest in Privacy Protection in and around Funerals, 41 IND. L. REV. 383 (2008).
159 See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 769 (1994) (“We have noted a
distinction between the type of focused picketing banned from the buffer zone and the type of
generally disseminated communication that cannot be completely banned in public places, such as
handbilling and solicitation.”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940) (“One may,
however, be guilty of [breach of the peace] if he commit acts or make statements likely to
provoke violence and disturbance of good order, even though no such eventuality be intended.
Decisions to this effect are many, but examination discloses that, in practically all, the
provocative language which was held to amount to a breach of the peace consisted of profane,
indecent, or abusive remarks directed to the person of the hearer.”) (emphasis added); cf. Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (“While the four-letter word displayed by Cohen in relation
to the draft is not uncommonly employed in a personally provocative fashion, in this instance it
was clearly not ‘directed to the person of the hearer.’” (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309)).
160 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988).
161 Id.; cf. Alan E. Brownstein, Hate Speech and Harassment: The Constitutionality of
Campus Codes That Prohibit Racial Insults, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 179, 206 (1994) (“Hate
speech is harassment because it is targeted expression that serves no purpose other than the
infliction of serious harm on its victims.”); Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They
Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287, 306 (1990) (“If racial and ethnic epithets and slurs
are to be made illegal by separate legal standards, the focus should be on face-to-face encounters,
targeted vilification aimed at members of the audience.”); Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of
Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1843-72 (1992) (state interest
justifies restrictions on directed speech (speech that is aimed at a particular individual) but not
undirected speech).
162 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486.
163 See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768. (“[W]hile targeted picketing of the home threatens the
psychological well-being of the ‘captive’ resident, targeted picketing of a hospital or clinic
threatens not only the psychological, but also the physical, well-being of the patient held ‘captive’ by
medical circumstance.” (citing Operation Rescue v. Women’s Health Ctr. Inc., 626 So. 2d 664,
673 (Fla. 1993))); see also Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing City of Wauwatosa v. King, 182 N.W.2d 530, 537 (Wis. 1971))
(describing the psychological tensions and pressures that result from targeted residential picketing).
164 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486.
165 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949) (“To enforce freedom of speech in disregard
of the rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself.”); cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[L]imits [on religious freedom] begin to operate
whenever activities begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public.”).
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want,”166 we carry with us a measure of protection from confrontational
acts,167 when we go to and from work,168 when we view display
advertising,169 when we use the city transit system,170 and when we seek
out medical care.171 Where there is room, literally, for disagreement (in
the meeting hall, park, street corner, or public thoroughfare), and where
there is opportunity for the unwilling recipient of someone else’s
communication to look the other way (in both literal and metaphorical
senses), “First Amendment values inalterably prevail.”172 But when
communication is forced upon us, the state has a substantial interest in
protecting our right to be let alone.173
Old as the saying is, it remains true that “whether the pitcher hits
the stone, or the stone the pitcher, it’s a bad business for the pitcher.”174
Some rights are simply more fragile than others; without state support,
they are bound to lose ground to their hardier counterparts. Alan
Brownstein usefully observes that when unequally strong rights collide,
a policy of non-involvement by the state will subordinate the weaker to
the stronger right.175 To illustrate the point, Brownstein considers a
protest at a house of worship (and, for our purposes, we may easily
substitute a protest at a funeral). The right to worship often presupposes
166
167

Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).
Cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000) (“The recognizable privacy interest in
avoiding unwanted communication varies widely in different settings. It is far less important
when ‘strolling through Central Park’ than when ‘in the confines of one’s own home,’ or when
persons are ‘powerless to avoid’ it. . . . But even the interest in preserving tranquility in ‘the
Sheep Meadow’ portion of Central Park may at times justify official restraints on offensive
musical expression.”) (internal citation omitted); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“In asking us to force the system to accept his message
as a vindication of his constitutional rights, the petitioner overlooks the constitutional rights of the
commuters. While petitioner clearly has a right to express his views to those who wish to listen,
he has no right to force his message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it.”).
168 See Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 204 (1921)
(“How far may men go in persuasion and communication and still not violate the right of those
whom they would influence? In going to and from work, men have a right to as free a passage
without obstruction as the streets afford, consistent with the right of others to enjoy the same
privilege. We are a social people and the accosting by one of another in an inoffensive way and an
offer by one to communicate and discuss information with a view to influencing the other’s action
are not regarded as aggression or a violation of that other’s rights. If, however, the offer is declined,
as it may rightfully be, then persistence, importunity, following and dogging become unjustifiable
annoyance and obstruction which is likely soon to savor of intimidation. From all of this the person
sought to be influenced has a right to be free, and his employer has a right to have him free.”).
169 See generally Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
170 See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303-04.
171 See generally Hill, 530 U.S. 703; Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
172 Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302.
173 See Hill, 530 U.S. at 717 & n.24 (characterizing “right to avoid unwelcome speech” as a
common-law “‘interest’ that States can choose to protect in certain situations”); see also, e.g., Caroline
Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939 (2009).
174 MIGUEL DE CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE 660 (Joseph R. Jones & Kenneth Douglas, eds.,
Norton 1981) (1605).
175 See Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct,
Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests—Section II, 29 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1163, 1192-1215 (1996).
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an environment conducive to spiritual activities. What happens when
protest activity destroys the requisite sense of religious sanctuary?
Brownstein suggests—rightly, I think—that a policy of noninvolvement by the state will subordinate the right to worship
peacefully to the right to speak loudly. “The formal equality of a policy
of non-regulation will result in substantive inequality.”176 Formal
equality “does not accommodate freedom of speech and freedom of
religion. Rather, it sacrifices the latter right to protect the exercise of
the former right.”177 More generally, it ignores the fundamental
principle that “the right of every person ‘to be let alone’ must be placed
in the scales with the right of others to communicate.”178
Tort liability can, at a minimum, maintain some degree of
substantive equality of rights. Federal and state statutes can protect those
private sanctuaries where we ought to be let alone: let alone to worship,179
let alone to mourn the dead.180 But tort liability can provide a more
elastic remedy against egregious forms of misconduct meant to disrupt
and distress.181 Emotional distress claims are well suited to suggest the
outer limits of civil tolerance for offensive speech. Because the bar an
emotional distress claimant must clear is a high one, such cases provide a
176
177
178

Id. at 1203.
Id. at 1205.
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970); cf. Burson v. Freeman, 504
U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (“Despite the ritualistic ease with which we state this now-familiar
[exacting scrutiny] standard, its announcement does not allow us to avoid the truly difficult issues
involving the First Amendment. Perhaps foremost among these serious issues are cases that force
us to reconcile our commitment to free speech with our commitment to other constitutional rights
embodied in government proceedings. . . . This case presents us with a particularly difficult
reconciliation: the accommodation of the right to engage in political discourse with the right to
vote-a right at the heart of our democracy.”) (internal citation omitted). But see Hill v. Colorado,
530 U.S. 703, 751 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s attempt to disguise the ‘right to
be let alone’ as a ‘governmental interest in protecting the right to be let alone’ is unavailing for
the simple reason that this is not an interest that may be legitimately weighed against the
speakers’ First Amendment rights . . . .”).
179 See supra note 157.
180 See supra note 158. On the constitutionality of funeral picketing statutes, see Stephen R.
McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws and Free Speech, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 575 (2007); Lauren M.
Miller, Comment, A Funeral for Free Speech? Examining the Constitutionality of Funeral
Picketing Acts, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1097 (2007); Cynthia Mosher, Comment, What They Died to
Defend: Freedom of Speech and Military Funeral Protests, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 587 (2007);
Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A Time to Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free Speech Against the Right
of Privacy in Funeral Picketing, 67 MD. L. REV. 295 (2008); Kara Beil, Note, Funeral Protest
Bans: Do They Kill Speech or Resurrect Respect for the Dead?, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 503 (2008);
Robert F. McCarthy, Note, The Incompatibility of Free Speech and Funerals: A Grayned-Based
Approach for Funeral Protest Statutes, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1469 (2007); Katherine A. Ritts, Note,
The Constitutionality of “Let Them Rest in Peace” Bills: Can Governments Say “Not Today,
Fred” to Demonstrations at Funeral Ceremonies?, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 137 (2007).
181 See generally Jeffrey Shulman, The Outrageous God: Emotional Distress, Tort Liability,
and the Limits of Religious Advocacy, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 381 (2008); cf. Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 782 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Yet, imperfect
though it is, an action for damages is the only hope for vindication or redress the law gives to a
man whose reputation has been falsely dishonored.”).
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way to establish a narrow limitation on speech that is by definition meant
to cause harm. To not provide a remedy for psychologically injurious
speech truly would be to sacrifice one set of rights for another.
Nor does adjudication of tort suits require any retreat from the First
Amendment principle that civil courts should not “intermeddle in
internal ecclesiastical disputes.”182 Mr. Snyder’s claim can be resolved
by the neutral and generally applicable principles of tort law. Tort
claims do not ask the Court to render a decision about “discipline, faith,
internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law,”183 to
“second-guess ecclesiastical decisions made by hierarchical church
bodies,”184 or to determine “the correctness of an interpretation of
canonical text . . . .”185 Such claims do not demand a judicial judgment
about the truth or falsity of religious belief.186 To the extent that
religious entities are held responsible for their misconduct, the burden
they suffer is “merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and
otherwise valid provision.”187
It is entirely consistent with legal precedent to hold religious
groups liable in tort when their religious advocacy subjects others to
emotional distress. The right of free exercise has always meant more
than the right to believe. Thomas Jefferson understood it to mean that
government could not “restrain the profession or propagation of
[religious] principles . . . .”188 If religious freedom leaves “all men . . .
free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion in matters of
religion,”189 by the same token there are times when we should be
equally free to avoid unwanted and offensive religious advocacy. While
“[r]eligious activities which concern only members of the faith are and

182 Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Jones v.
Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
709-10 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29 (1871).
183 Bell, 126 F.3d at 331 (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713).
184 Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 683 A.2d 808, 811 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996)
(citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 724-25 (“In short, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and
regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating
disputes over these matters. When this choice is exercised and ecclesiastical tribunals are created
to decide disputes over the government and direction of subordinate bodies, the Constitution
requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them.”)).
185 Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 878 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987).
186 See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (courts will not inquire as to the truth or
falsity of religious beliefs).
187 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (to make religious practices
superior to the law of the land would permit every citizen “‘to become a law unto himself’”
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878))).
188 Thomas Jefferson, The Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom (1786), reprinted in THE
VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY, at xviii (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 2003) (1988).
189 Id.
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ought to be free—as nearly absolutely free as anything can be,”190 tort
liability protects the rights of others to choose religious belief or to
choose none at all.191
The Hustler Court was concerned that “‘[o]utrageousness’ in the
area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness
about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the
jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a
particular expression.”192 Perhaps so, but in the funeral of a private
individual we might find “a principled standard”193 by which to
circumscribe emotional distress claims within a safe constitutional
perimeter. Where discourse is not, in fact, of public concern, where it is
targeted to a private audience unwilling to receive it but unable to avoid
it, where its purpose is to injure, then its restriction is little threat to free
speech values; where public concern is a mask for mere personal abuse,
private individuals should have full legal recourse to secure their right
to be let alone.
CONCLUSION
“[T]he rights and values of private personality far transcend mere
personal interests.”194

So what shall become of our impeccable neighbor? I think she
deserves her day in court, even though most speech-based emotional
distress claims are unlikely to survive summary judgment. (There is not
much speech anymore that makes us want to cry out, “Outrageous!”)
190
191

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment).
Cf. Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 779 (Okla. 1989) (“No real
freedom to choose religion would exist in this land if under the shield of the First Amendment
religious institutions could impose their will on the unwilling and claim immunity from secular
judicature for their tortious acts.”) (footnote omitted).
192 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988). Cf. Paul T. Hayden, Religiously
Motivated “Outrageous” Conduct: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon
against “Other People’s Faiths,” 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 579, 580 (1993) (Emotional distress
claims “are ill defined, requiring the trier of fact in each case to render an ad hoc judgment about
the outrageousness of the particular defendant’s particular conduct.”); Douglas Laycock, The
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 45-46 (describing tort suits based on religious
speech as “characterized by attempts to incite the jury to fear and hatred of a strange faith.”);
Massey, supra note 48, at 121 (“Hustler can thus be seen to be a repudiation of pluralism as a
foundation for free speech, but an even deeper meaning may be derived from the case. If
‘outrageousness’ were to have been recognized as an exception from free speech, the standards of
every community would prevail, thus regulating public discourse at the level of the most
restrictive community. Alternatively, if some ‘objective’ standard of ‘reasonableness’ were to be
employed in testing ‘outrageousness,’ the standards of the community most ‘objectively
reasonable’ would govern. In either case, the prevailing mode of legal thought would have been
distinctly culturally authoritarian, for the values of one group would control all others.”).
193 Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 55.
194 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 782 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Whether or not the alleged harlotry of the Catholic Church is a matter of
public concern, there must be some demonstrable connection between our
neighbor and that concern to justify special constitutional protection for
speech branding her a whore, some connection greater than the mere fact
that our neighbor is Catholic. It is not a matter of civility, but of civilness; we do not have to be nice, but we do have to live with one another.
In its cases dealing with speech-based tort claims, the Supreme
Court has spent almost fifty years juggling constitutional and commonlaw concerns. It would, no doubt, be a great relief to find some way to
end the sport, perhaps by adopting a categorical principle that protects
abusive speech unless it amounts to “fighting words.”195 But other
forms of speech, if not quite outside the constitutional pale, do not
warrant protection from tort suit. Where speech is directed at a private
individual, especially one unwilling to hear but unable to escape the
speaker’s message, the elements of the emotional distress claim more
than satisfy the appropriate constitutional standard. Indeed, such a
standard can help create a civil space where both robust advocacy and
the freedom to avoid robust advocacy can flourish.
Matthew Snyder died in service to his country, but the injuries that
took his life left a legacy of trauma for his family. The state’s interest
in protecting—at least for a moment of mourning—the peace and
privacy of the Snyder family is a substantial one. The Fourth Circuit
failed to protect that interest. It is now the Supreme Court’s opportunity
to decide whether our nation’s profound commitment to the contentious
discussion of public issues is also a license for egregiously intrusive and
injurious speech.

195 Such an approach would be at odds with many existing speech restrictions.
See
Brownstein, supra note 161, at 181-82. Brownstein argues that “[t]he problem of targeted
abusive speech directed at specific victims can only be resolved through a multi-factored
analysis. . . . If verbal harassment is to be coherently defined and regulated, speech has to be
evaluated as to its content, its purpose, its impact, and in terms of the circumstances in which it
occurs.” Id. at 215-16. But see Massey, supra note 48, at 155 (legitimacy of captive audience
doctrine “outside of Chaplinsky-type circumstances is problematic”).

